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PART PERFORIMANCE IN RELATION TO PAROL
CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF LANDS
DONALD- KFPNE_*
O N the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the enactment of
the Statute of Frauds,' a contemporary British writer pro-
posed that the occasion be celebrated by a dinner to be given in
honor of the Statute in one of the Inns of Court. While urged on
the one hand to invite a suitable number of litigants who had been
deprived of their rights by means of the Statute, the hosts were
warned on the other hand, to take care that none of the silver dis-
appear if the celebrants included those who had sheltered themselves
behind the Statute's useful provisions.
2
More direct in the expression of their condemnation, other critics
have recommended the outright repeal of what has been termed,
"this piece of morbid anatomy."3 But the Act has mustered suffi-
cient friends to block the attempts to strike it from the books, de-
spite the fact that it has proved to be a perpetual source of litigation,
and notwithstanding that the evils responsible for its adoption have
long since disappeared.
Although poor draftsmanship created uncertainties in the
Statute requiring judicial clarification, no small part of the blame
for the mass of litigation may be credited to a faulty construction
of the Act by the judges themselves. Indeed, if Lord Nottingham,
who claimed the authorship of the Act,4 could have foreseen the
controversies caused by the ambiguous language of Section Four,
he would no doubt have been quick to give the "judges and the
*Associate Professor, Rutgers University School of Law.
1. Statute 29 Car. II, c. 3 (1677).
2. Note, 43 L. Q. Rev. 1 (1927).
3. Id. at 2.
4. 6 Holdsworth, History of the English Law 384 (1924).
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civilians," entire credit for this section. He might even have divulged
the meaning of the Law, which he professed to know.5
But Lord Nottingham passed on the task of construing Section
Four of the Enactment to future generations of judges. That they
have not entirely succeeded in their task is attested by the fact that
the application of the doctrine of part performance is not much
more certain than it was two hundred and seventy years ago. This
is demonstrated by the fact that as recently as 1948 a distinguished
equity scholar reviewed the litigation for the year previous, and
concluded that however well the doctrine of part performance had
been worked out as a matter of principle, the cases were, never-
theless, in "a welter of confusion."6
It is the author's contention that the present confusion in the
law of part performance is due primarily to its historical develop-
ment. This, we propose to establish by showing that over a long
period of time there were divergent views among the English
judges, both as to the reasoning underlying part performance, and
as to its advisability as a matter of policy. These differences of
opinion culminated in a belated attempt to discredit the doctrine
altogether. Nevertheless, the judges were consistent in their deter-
mination of the acts that constituted part performance, and in their
acceptance of the doctrine as a part of equity jurisprudence.
Unfortunately, the principle of part performance was received
in this country during the period in which it was being questioned
in England, although no proposals were being entertained for its
abolition in that country. When considered in the light of this de-
velopment, the British cases become of importance not only from
the viewpoint of their influence in the shaping of the English Law,
but also in relation to the reception of the concept of part perform-
ance in the United States.
While the discussion of the American cases because of their
number will be limited to those involving parol agreements for the
sale of freehold interests, the English decisions include litigation
involving both leasing contracts and contracts of sale. The latter
5. Ash v. Abdy, 3 Swanst. 664; 36 Eng. Rep. 1014 (Ch. 1678). The
Lord Chancellor is quoted as having said, "I had some reason to know the
meaning of this law; for it had its first rise from me who brought in the bill
into the Lord's House, although it afterwards received some additions and
improvements from the judges and the civilians."
6. Simpson, Equity in 1947 Annual Survey of American Law 803, note
96 (1948).
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jurisdiction did not recognize a difference between the two transac-
tions insofar as part performance was concerned. 7
PART PERFORMANCE PRIOR TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUis
Due to the research of Professor Barbour 8 fifteenth century
chancery cases have been brought to light, disclosing that parol
agreements to sell land were enforced in equity a score of years be-
fore their validity was recognized in the courts of law.
Although the petitioner in these ancient bills particularized any
damage resulting from his reliance on the defendant's oral promise,
allegations of special injury were not essential. Such facts were
stated by the complaintant solely for the purpose of presenting his
case in its strongest light; for the litigant, it must be remembered,
was appealing to the Chancellor's mercy. It will be recalled that
fifteenth century chancery judges were ecclesiastics who were
steeped in the idea that faith should be kept in agreements,9 and
who enforced parol contracts of all types where a remedy was
unavailable in law. •
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries equity con-
tinued to specifically enforce oral agreements. The origin of a
remedy in contract no doubt influenced the Chancellor to surrender
jurisdiction in controversies relating to the sale of chattels, al-
though he still decreed specific performance on the part of recalci-
trant vendors of land.
But the passage of time witnessed a new development in equity
practice, for where formerly the Chancellor had decreed perform-
ance of all land contracts, the records disclose that during this
period relief was sometimes denied.' 0 Generally the reasons for re-
fusing assistance are not given, although the Lord Keeper is pur-
ported to have stated in one instance that it would be good for the
commonwealth if no parol leases were allowed," while in another
case he proposed to avoid perjury and other abuses by refusing to
enforce oral leases.' 2
7. It was the nature of the Act, not the estate conveyed that was the
decisive factor in making the determination of whether specific performance
should be decreed.
8. Barbour, History of Contract in Early English Equity in 4 Oxford
Studies in Social and Legal History 116 (1914).
9. 1 Holdsworth, History of the English Law 455 (3d ed. 1923).
10. St. Germaine, The Doctor and Student 62 (Muchall ed. 1874).
Writing in 1523, St. Germaine declared, "But if a man sells his lands by a
sufficient and lawful contract, though there lack livery of seisin or such other
solemnities of the law, yet the seller is bound in conscience to perform this
contract. But in this case the contract is sufficient, and so me thinketh great
diversity betwixt the cases."
11. Anon., Cary 27, 21 Eng. Rep. 15 (Ch. 1603).
12. Anon., Cary 7, 21 Eng. Rep. 4 (Ch. 1597-98).
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Although scarce in number and scanty in detail, the reports of
the chancery cases, nevertheless, reveal a greater willingness to
decree specific performance of contracts involving the transfer of
freehold interests, than estates for years.1 Tothill and other
contemporary reporters relate the granting of equitable assistance
because of a want of livery,1 4 a defective assurance, 15 or upon the
vendor's refusal to perform.' 6
Eighteenth century authorities, writing on the subject of part
performance in the above Period, bear out these conclusions, Viner's
Abridgement includes suits decided during the preceding two cen-
turies, and throws light on the development of part performance in
this period. Cases are reported in which equity decreed specific
performance under such circumstances as the death of the vendor
before assurance was perfected, and upon the failure of the lessor
to give livery to a lessee in possession.17
Although written somewhat later, an historic work on the law•
of vendor and purchaser warns the reader that he cannot be too
cautious in distinguishing between the cases decided before the
Statute of Frauds and those decided afterwards. Following a dis-
cussion of such problems as the effect of a transfer of possession
or of part payment as acts of part performance, the author con-
cludes the presentation with the observation that equity seems to
have been guided by the same rule in compelling a specific per-
formance of parol agreements before the Statute, as have been ad-
hered to since.' 8
It seems probably that by 1677, Chancery judges had formu-
lated a pattern for enforcing oral agreements relating to the land
contracts. For proof that such jurisdiction was recognized, we turn
to the implied acknowledgment of such practice found in Ash v.
Abdy' 9 decided in 1678, and to the express recognition in Marquis
of Normandy v. Duke of Devonshire,2 0 adjudged twenty-one years
13. Page v. Spencer, Cho. Cas. Ch. 149, 21 Eng. Rep. 88 (Ch. 1581) ;
Nichols v. Lonell, Cho. Cas. Ch. 171, 21 Eng. Rep. 99 (Ch. 1583). However,
specific execution of leases were decreed in Redman v. Torrell, Tot. 69 (1820
ed.), 21 Eng. Rep. 126 (Ch. 1575-76); Prince v. Green, Tot. 127, 21 Eng.
Rep. 144 (Ch. 1598) ; Hungerford v. Austein, Nels. 47, 21 Eng. Rep. 786
(Ch. 1650).
14. Conquest v. Newdigate, Tot. 42, 21 Eng. Rep. 118 (Ch. 1611-12);
Moreton v. Briggs, Tot. 43, 21 Eng. Rep. 118 (Ch. 1619).
15. Bodenham v. Bodenham, Rep. t. Finch 174, 23 Eng. Rep. 96
(Ch. 1674).
16. Hungerford v. Hutton, Tot. 63, 21 Eng. Rep. 124 (Ch. 1569-70).
17. 13 Vin. Abr. 205 (2d ed. 1791).
18. Sugden, The Law of Vendors and Purchasers of Estates 86 (1807).
19. 3 Swanst. 664, 36 Eng. Rep. 1014 (Ch. 1678).
20. 2 Freem. Ch. 216, 22 Eng. Rep. 1169 (Ch. 1697).
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later. In the later case it was declared, "Before the statute of frauds
and perjuries, this court would not execute a parol agreement, un-
less it had been executed in part of one side or the other; and then it
would, because it was but reason, when one party had performed of
his part, that the other party should be compelled of his part."21
DOES THE FOURTH SECTION OF THE STATUTE
APPLY TO LAND CONTRACTS IN EQUITY?
Legal scholars until the twentieth century explained the doc-
trine of part performance either on the ground that an inherent
equity arising from acts performed by one of the parties in reliance
on the agreement gave chancery jurisdiction notwithstanding the
Statute,22 or on the theory that the enactment applied to both law
and equity despite the inequities which might be produced and
that the cases holding otherwise had been incorrectly decided.2
The above conceptions were so -entrenched in the literature of
the day that the more recent analysis of Professor Costigan, who
proposed that Section Four of the Statute had never applied to
suits in equity, made little impression on courts or scholars. Never-
theless, his arguments if viewed in the historical perspective of the
development of part performance, are convincing and deserve
further consideration.
Examining the first draft of the bill introduced in the House of
Lords in 1673,24 Costigan found that Section Four provided that
actions in debt, case or other personal actions could not be brought
in excess of a designated amount, if the action was based on an oral
agreement. Reasoning that the phrase, "no action shall be brought,"
embodied in the Bill as finally enacted, was merely a refinement of
words used in the first draft,25 he concluded that the Section ap-
21. Ibid.
22. See Pollock, Principles of Contracts 611 (4th ed. 1885); Gilbert,
The History and Practice of the High Court of Chancery 231 (1758).
23. See 3 Parsons, Law of Contracts 394 (5th ed. 1866).
24. Costigan, Has there been Judicial Legislation in the Interpretation
of the .. .Statute of Frauds, 14 Ill. L. Rev. 1, 9, note 26 (1919).
25. The first bill introduced in 1673 is reproduced in Henning, The
Original Drafts of the Statute of Frauds and their Authors, 61 U. of Pa.
L. R. 283, 285 (1913). The appropriate section read as follows, "And be it
further enacted by the Authority aforesaid That in all actions upon Case
Actions of Debt or other personal Actions which from and after the ............
day of ........................ shall be commenced upon any Assumpsit Promise Con-
tract or Agreement made or supposed to be made by Paroll and Whereof
noe Memorandum Note or Memoriall in writing shall bee taken by the
Direction of the parties thereunto noe greater damages shall at any time be
recovered than the some of Any law usuage to the Contrary notwithstanding."
1950)
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plied only to actions at law as distinguished from "bills" or "suits"
in equity.
Before Costigan's findings are rejected, it may be remembered
that Chancery had specifically enforced parol contracts for the
sale of lands for more than two hundred years.26 If the Statute was
intended to dislodge this ancient jurisdiction, its framers could have
provided for this drastic change in explicit language. The drafts-
men made known their intentions with reference to Section One
when they expressly stated that in "law or equity" parol agreements
shall have a stated effect.2 7 From the absence of similar language
in Section Four it may reasonably be implied that equity does not
come within its provisions.
The authors of the Statute could have accomplished their ob-
jective of eliminating oral conveyances in Section One of the Act,
without necessarily invalidating parol contracts in Section Four,
since the latter does not create an estate but only a possibility of
specific performance under the rules of chancery. It is not the oral
contract but the decree of the court or the act of the parties per-
formed pursuant to the decree, that transfers the estate. There can
be no greater objection to conveying an interest in land by opera-
tion of the chancellor's decree than to transferring rights by judicial
record in a fine and recovery.
Since Section Seventeen of the Act provided that part per-
formance will take an oral sale of goods out of the Statute, it has
been reasoned that the absence of a similar provision in the Fourth
Section creates an inference that Parliament did not intend to ap-
ply the doctrine of part performance to land contracts .2 This would
be a plausible argument were it not for the fact that the Statute
must be construed in light of the remedies existing at the time of
its enactment, which included suits for specific performance when
the contract related to land, but not so if the subject matter of the
agreement was a chattel. A contrary implication arises from that
suggested; for the language in Section Seventeen reveals that the
question of part performance was considered by the draftsman, and
26. Text supra at note 8.
27. That Section 1 of the first bill applied to equity is indicated by the
following language, "Bee it Enacted that from and after the ............ day of
........................ All Leases Estates Interests or Tearmes of Yeares of in to or
out of any measuges mannors Lands Tenements or Hereditaments made or
unto shall have the force and effect of leases or estates at will, only and shall
created by Paroll and not put into writing by direction of the parties there-
unto shall have the force and effect of leases or estates at will, only and shall
not either in Law or Equity bee deemed or taken to have any other or
greater force or effect. . ."
28. Clinan v. Cooke, 1 Sch. & Lef. 22 (Ir. Ch. 1802).
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his act of adding part performance to oral sales of chattels, and his
silence on the effect of part performance in parol contracts for the
sale of lands, points to his approval of the doctrine. Here again,
if the Statute's framers intended to abolish an existing remedy in
equity, they would have used language designed to achieve the
desired result.
A third reason for supporting Costigan's conclusion lies in the
fact that the Chancery judges during the period immediately follow-
ing the adoption of the Statute, for the most part did not question
their jurisdiction to grant relief where the contract was partly per-
formed. It is not without significance that the House of Lords only
twenty-three years after the Statute's adoption recognized part per-
formance.29 Contemporaneous interpretations by judges,30 some
of whom must have participated in its enactment, and who were
familiar with the former practices of equity, are not to be con-
sidered lightly in searching for the meaning of the Statute.
It has been argued that the Statute in its entirety did not apply
to Chancery because the purpose of the Enactment was to prevent
juries from deciding cases on perjured testimony, and since the
chancellor resolved controversies without the aid of juries, it was
not likely that he would be misled. If that were true, why did Sec-
tion One apply to equity? Unless this Section can be explained in
terms of providing a uniform system of conveyancing, Section One
refutes the proposal that equity was excluded from all of the provi-
sions of the Statute. This conclusion, however, does not weaken
the case for excluding equity from controversies arising from
Section Four.
A SURVEY OF THE CONTROLLING BRITISH CASES
DECIDED AFTER 1677
In view of the subsequent disagreement among the authorities
as to the basic theory underlying part performance, it is interesting
to note that the first three cases decided after the enactment of the
Statute do not purport to establish any general principles govern-
ing the application of the doctrine.
One of the first cases31 arising under the new Act was Hollis v.
29. Lester v. Foxcroft, Colles 108, 1 Eng. Rep. 205 (H.L. 1700).
30. Costigan, supra note 24.
31. In 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 48, An unnamed case is stated as follows, "The
first case in Lord Nottingham's time, where there was an absolute conveyance
and a defeasance, which defendant could not execute, but insisted on the
Statute and it was overruled." This appears to be a mortgage rather than a
sale.
1950]
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Edwards,8 2 adjudged in 1683 by the Lord Keeper. The plaintiff al-
leged an execution of a parol agreement for a lease and a subsequent
expenditure of money made in reliance on the agreement. The Lord
Keeper was of the opinion that plaintiff could recover damages at
law for the non-performance of the contract and if that were the
case, he had no doubt that he could decree performance in equity.
The defendants were ordered to admit the agreement for the pur-
pos of bringing an action at law, and were advised that after judg-
ment was rendered, equity would further consider the case. The
plaintiff was non-suited at law, and his bill in equity dismissed, the
report being silent as to the reasons for the subsequent dismissal in
Chancery. The Court's opinion revealed that it was puzzled as to
how the Statute should be applied; the Lord Keeper suggesting that
while the Act voided the estate, it did not void the agreement. The
fact that the Court dismissed the suit may indicate later doubts on
the part of the Lord Keeper, although of course there is no way of
knowing if this were true. However, the distinction between void
estates and void contracts, recognized in this controversy is im-
portant, for without the distinction, there can be no basis for
equitable jurisdiction in this type of case.
Two years later in the leading case of Butcher v. Stapely,33
specific performance was decreed against a defaulting vendor and a
subsequent grantee who took with notice of the prior oral agree-
ment. The plaintiff set out as part performance the act of placing
his cattle upon the land. The pith of the Chancellor's opinion is
found in a single sentence in which he stated, "Inasmuch as the
possession was delivered according to the agreement, he took the
bargain to be executed and that it was a contrivance between the
defendants to avoid the bargain.""4 The case has generally been
cited as authority for the proposition that delivery of possession is
in itself a sufficient part performance to take a case out of the
Statute.
Any doubt that may have remained in the minds of the judges
as a result of a possible conflict between the first two cases, was
removed by the decision rendered in 1700 by the House of Lords
in Lester v. Foxcro ft. 85 Reversing the Lord Chancellor, who had
strictly applied the Statute, the High Court enforced an oral lease
for ninety-nine years where the lessee had taken possession and had
32. 1 Vein. 159, 23 Eng. Rep. 385 (Ch. 1683).
33. 1 Vern. 363, 23 Eng. Rep. 524 (Ch. 1685).
34. Id. at 365, 23 Eng. Rep. at 525.
35. Colles 108, 1 Eng. Rep. 205 (H.L. 1700).
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erected buildings pursuant to the terms of the agreement. The
decree was enforced against the devisee of the lessor who had pre-
vented the plaintiff from completing the agreement during the life-
time of the lessor. While it has been suggested that part perform-
ance should be decreed only in situations involving fraud, eighteenth
century courts did not read any such limitation in the Foxcroft
case. It is not reported on what theory, if any, the Court based its
decision.
The picture with reference to general principles changes in
1703 for in the controversy of Floyd v. Buckland0 we find the
Master of Rolls laying down a general principle in the form of
equitable fraud as the basis for granting relief. A lessee had entered
the premises and had built a wall in accordance with the terms of
the parol agreement. Decreeing specific performance on behalf of
the lessee, the court observed that the "Statute was not made to
encourage frauds and cheats.1 37
A question which produced great difficulty on both sides of the
Atlantic, arose in England in 1702 in the litigation styled Croyston
v. Banes.38 The defendant had confessed the oral agreement in his
answer. Declaring that the object of the Statute was to prevent
perjury, the court argued that if the agreement was admitted there
could be no perjury, and that there remained no reason why the
Statute should apply. Specific execution would be decreed even in
the absence of an allegation of part performance on the part of the
plaintiff.
Adding a refinement, the court noted in 172339 that if the de-
fendant confessed the oral agreement in his answer, the contract
would be enforced even though the defendant also pleaded the
Statute of Frauds. Subsequent dicta4 0 supporting this questionable
holding prolonged its life for another fifty years. However, in Whit-
church v. Bevis,41 decided during the last quarter of the eighteenth
century, the court rejected the theory that the Statute was waived
if the parol contract was confessed. Succeeding cases4 2 following
the holding in the Whitchurch litigation, ended the controversy.
From then on, unless the plaintiff alleged acts of part performance,
the defendant could always invoke the aid of the Statute. If part
36. 2 Freen. Ch. 268, 22 Eng. Rep. 1202 (Ch. 1703).
37. Ibid.
38. Prec. Ch. 208, 24 Eng. Rep. 102 (Ch. 1702).
39. Child v. Godolphin, 1 Dick. 39, 21 Eng. Rep. 181 (Ch. 1723).
40. Gunter v. Halsey, Amb. 586, 27 Eng. Rep. 381 (Ch. 1739).
41. 2 Dick. 664, 21 Eng. Rep. 430, (Ch. 1786).
42. Moore v. Evans, 4 Ves. Jr. 23 (Ch. 1798) ; Bragdon v. Bradbear, 12
Ves. 466 (Ch. 1806).
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performance was pleaded, the question was then one of fact to be
established by evidence.
In 1709 in the case of Lord Pengall v. Ross, 43 the issue of
whether the payment of part of the purchase price was a sufficient
part performance to justify equitable relief, was raised for the first
time. In unequivocal language the court voiced its opinion, de-
claring, "There must be something more than bare payment of
money on the one part to induce the Court to decree a specific per-
formance.1 44 Followed in later litigation, 45 the holding in the Ross
case would have conclusively decided this issue had it not been for
the dicta of Lord Hardwicke in Lacon v. Mertins,4 when he mis-
takenly but convincingly announced that payment of money had
always been held a part performance in Chancery. Despite subse-
quent holdings to the contrary,47 Lord Hardwicke's declaration
resulted in the question being declared an open one as late as 1815,48
and it was not put to rest in England until late in the nineteenth
century.49
It was in 173950 that the Chancellor announced that the acts
relied upon to show part performance must be solely referable to
the contract. Expressing the rule in another form, a later court
declared that the act relied upon must be, "an act.. . unequivocally
referable to the agreement."' 51
The unequivocal reference theory fails to explain the basis
underlying part performance, but acts only as a test of exclusion.
It may be compared to the tort rule of proximate cause vhich some-
times results in the denial of recovery on the ground that causation
in law does not exist, although causation in fact has been established.
The exclusionary effect of the rule is demonstrated in the case in
which it originated, for there it was held that the acts relied upon
did not unequivocally refer to a contract to renew the lease. 5
That there may be a variety of acts that would satisfy the stan-
dards of equity for determining part performance, was recognized
by the House of Lords as early as 1765 in Whaley v. Bagnel.5a Re-
43. 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 46, 22 Eng. Rep. 40 (Ch. 1709).
44. Ibid.
45. Seagood v. Meale, Prec. Ch. 560, 24 Eng. Rep. 251 (Ch. 1721).
46. 3 Atk. 1, 26 Eng. Rep. 803 (Ch. 1743).
47. Main v. Melbourn, 4 Ves. Sr. 719, 31 Eng. Rep. 372 (Ch. 1799);
Clinan v. Cooke, 1 Sch. & Lef. 22 (Ir. Ch. 1802).
48. Aveling v. Knipe, 19 Ves. 440, 34 Eng. Rep. 580 (Ch. 1815).
49. Britain v. Rossiter, 11 Q. B. D. 123 (1879).
50. Gunter v. Halsey, Anab. 586, 27 Eng. Rep. 381 (Ch. 1739).
51. Morphett v. Jones, 1 Swanst. 172, 181, 36 Eng. Rep. 344, 348 (Ch.
1818).
52. Ibid.
53. 6 Bro. P. C. 45, 1 Eng. Rep. 611 (H.L. 1765).
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viewing a decision of the Lord Chancellor of Ireland based on a
comparable Statute, it was adjudged that the delivery of a rent
roll was not sufficient part performance to take the case out of the
Statute.
Declared the High Court in reaching the decision, "Contracts
partly executed by delivery of possession, receipt of some of the
purchase money, or attendant with some fraud on the part of the
vendor who has made use of the Act for sheltering such fraud, are
justly decreed to be specifically performed; but those were quite
foreign to the present case." 54
For some unexplained reason the opinion in the Whaley case
had little influence in the United States. This was unfortunate for
the decision clearly expressed a recognition that part performance
could not be explained on any single theory, but that in any one
of a possible variety of circumstances, equity might consider it un-
just to deny specific execution. If the broader principle had been
accepted by the American Courts, much of the confusion now exist-
ing would have been avoided.
The Irish Courts, however, did exercise a strong influence in
some of the American states as evidenced by the acceptance of the
language of an opinion rendered by Lord Redesdale in 1804.55
Sued for specific performance of a parol agreement to grant a lease
for three lives, the defendant admitted an agreement to grant a
lease for one life, and pleaded the Statute to any claim for the
longer term. Refusing relief to the plaintiff, the Lord Chancellor
found that inasmuch as the lease for one life was admitted, the
plaintiff was rightfully in possession, and the denial of specific per-
formance would not make the lessee a trespasser.
In an opinion which greatly influenced American jurists, Lord
Redesdale stated, "I am not disposed to carry the cases which have
been determined on the Statute of Frauds any further than I am
compelled to by former decisions; That Statute was made for the
purpose of preventing perjuries and frauds, and nothing can be
more manifest to any person who has been in the habit of practicing
in courts of equity, than the relaxation of that Statute has been a
ground of much perjury and fraud."' 56
Also widely cited in the States was Morphett v. Jones,57 decided
in 1818. In reliance upon the defendant's oral promise to grant a
54. Id. at 617.
55. Lindsay v. Lynch, 2 Sch. & Lef. 1 (Ir. Ch. 1804).
56. Id. at 5.
57. 1 Swanst. 172, 36 Eng. Rep. 344 (Ch. 1818).
1950]
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lease for a term of twenty-one years, plaintiff had taken possession
of the premises. Shortly thereafter he was served with notice to quit.
In an action to restrain the defendant from proceeding at law to re-
cover the premises and to compel the defendant to execute the lease,
the Master of the Rolls decreed a specific performance of the agree-
ment. The basis for his action, declared the court, was that, "A
party who permitted another to perform acts on the faith of an
agreement, shall not insist that the agreement is bad.""8
It was also stated in the Morphett case that, "Admission into
possession, having unequivocal reference to such contracts, has al-
ways been considered an act of part performance."5 9 Contrary to
the theory suggested by some courts, delivery of possession was not
recognized as an act of part performance because it tends to show
that a contract has been made. What the Master of the Rolls was
stating was that admission into possession was an act that would
not have happened in the absence of a contract. But the determina-
tion of whether or not specific execution of the oral agreement
would be ordered would depend on other factors than the fact
that a contract has been proved.
In deciding the nature of acts that would be recognized as part
performance, the English Courts in a series of cases held that con-
tinuation of possession by a lessee as distinguished from entering
into possession ;60 the giving of instructions to an attorney to draft
a lease,"' or draw a conveyance ;12 or the act of desisting from bid-
ding for the premises at an auction,63 were not such as to invoke
equitable assistance in the enforcement of an oral agreement.
Although specific performance was not decreed because of the
particular facts involved, the principle that delivery of possession
will take a case out of the Statute was recognized in Hawkins v.
Holmes ;64 Seagood v. Meale ;65 Buckmaster v. Harrop;66 and
Clinan v. Cooke.67 For whatever value dicta may have in develop-
ing the law, these cases were important.
By 1765 the various theories had run their course in England,
58. Id. at 52.
59. Ibid.
60. Smith v. Turner, Prec. Ch. 561 (Ch. 1720).
61. Cole v. White, 1 Bro. C. C. cited 409, 2 Chaffee & Simpson, Cases
on Equity 1089 (Ch. 1767).
62. Clerk v. Wright, 1 Atk. 12, 26 Eng. Rep. 9 (Ch. 1737).
63. Lamas v. Bayly, 2 Vern. 626, 23 Eng. Rep. 1011 (Ch. 1708).
64. 1 P. Wins 770, 24 Eng. Rep. 606 (Ch. 1721).
65. Prec. Ch. 560, 24 Eng. Rep. 251 (Ch. 1721).
66. 7 Ves. 341, 21 Eng. Rep. 139 (Rolls 1802).
67. 1 Sch. & Lef. 22 (Ir. Ch. 1802).
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so that the principles governing the application of the law of part
performance had become fixed. Although there were later dicta to
the contrary, nevertheless, the cases had adjudicated that payment
of the purchase price was not in itself recognized as an act of part
performance. It was settled beyond the point of dispute that de-
livery of possession to the purchaser or the lessee would take the
contract out of the Statute. If in possession prior to the agreement, a
purchaser must show that valuable improvements were added to the
premises in reliance upon the contract, and that it would be a fraud
to enforce the Statute against him. In most instances the pattern
for the type of act that would constitute fraud had been judicially
traced. Although occasionally challenged in later litigation, never-
theless, the above principles had been stated in their final form.
PART PERFORMANCE IN THE UNITED STATES PRIOR *TO 1850
The Statute was enacted in many of the states in substantially
the same form as the Parent Act."" Perhaps the draftsmen borrowed
more than they bargained for; as the American Judiciary soon
found themselves struggling with the same problems of construc-
tion that had perplexed their English counterpart.
But where as in Britain only one system of courts wrestled
with the Statute, on the western side of the Atlantic as many
courts as there were states were making independent interpreta-
tions of the Enactment. The majority of the American jurisdictions
ostensibly followed the English adjudications, although in some
instances the language of the court criticizing the doctrine was
adopted rather than the actual holding of the British tribunals.
The year 1805 witnessed cases of first impression decided on an
identical set of facts in the appellate courts69 of the states of Con-
68. Although in some jurisdictions Section Four was enacted in dif-
ferent language, the courts have applied the same construction to its revised
form. See 2 Chaffee and Simpson, Cases on Equity 1054 (1934). The various
statutes will be discussed in detail in Part II of this article.
69. Adjudications recognizing part performance had been made in a
number of states by trial courts. Examples are Rogers v. Tracy, 1 Root 233
(Conn. 1790) ; and Smith v. Broilsford, 1 Desaus Ch. 350 (S.C. 1794).
70. Downey v. Hotchkiss, 2 Day 225 (Conn. Sup. Ct. of Errors 1805).
The subsequent Connecticut cases recognized that part performance takes
a case out of the Statute, but the court did not attempt to define the acts
recognized as being sufficient. In Church v. Sterling, 16 Conn. 388 (1844)
specific execution was decreed upon a showing that the plaintiff had entered
into possession and made valuable improvements. Similarly, in Anzan v.
Merrit, 13 Conn. 478 (1840) entry had been made and valuable improve-
ments added. In Crocher v. Higgins, 7 Conn. 342 (1829), the court stated
as a general principle that where the acts done are performed with a view to
the agreement claimed, the contract is within the Statute.
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necticut7 ° and New York.71 In each instance the plaintiff alleged
part payment, an entry into possession and the addition of im-
provements. Affirming the Chancellor's decree of specific perform-
ance, the High Court of Connecticut neither wrote an opinion nor
divulged the theory on which the case was decided.
The New York Court7 2 had no difficulty in finding grounds for
granting specific execution in the case before it. To allow the
Statute to bar the performance of agreements partly executed,
reasoned the Court, would be to encourage the mischiefs the legis-
lature intended to prevent. Language in later New York cases7
suggested the principle that in accordance with the English rule,
taking of possession was in itself sufficient part performance, when
referable to the contract, and if performed as owner of the estate.
However, the point had not been decided by 1850, as evidenced by
the fact that some of the cases intimated that only in the case of
equitable fraud would such oral contracts be enforced.
Notwithstanding that its Statute of Frauds did not contain the
provisions of Section Four of the original act and despite the fact
that it had no court of chancery, Pennsylvania, nevertheless, recog-
nized the doctrine of part performance in 1807."4 The handicap of
not having a court of equity was overcome by applying equitable
principles in suits at law. Since the theory of Section Four with
reference to parol contracts was adopted as a matter of judicial
rather than legislative policy, the Court felt constrained to adopt
the interpretations of the Section which, of course, included part
performance. The judges were unable to agree on the principles
underlying the English cases, so that while one line of cases sup-
ported the proposition that delivery of possession took the contract
out of the operation of the Statute,"5 another line required in addi-
tion to possession, expenditures by the purchaser.70 In one instance
the court announced that specific execution would be decreed when
71. Wetmore v. White, 2 Caines 87, 2 Am. Dec. 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1805).
72. Ibid.
73. The leading case, Parkhurst v. Van Cortland, 14 Johns. 15, 7 Am.
Dec. 427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. of Jud. 1816) stated the part performance was based
on fraud, such as where the purchaser makes improvements. However, in
Harris v. Knickerbacker, 5 Wend. 638 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. of Jud. 1830) the
purchaser's survey and entry were held to be sufficient. Other cases do not
clearly state which acts of part performance will take a case out of the
Statute.
74. Elbert v. Wood, 1 Binn. 216 (Pa. 1807).
75. Gilday v. Watson, 2 S. & R. 407 (Pa. 1816) ; Pugh v. Good, 3 W.
& S. 56, 37 Am. Dec. 534 (Pa. 1841) ; Miller v. Specht, 1 Jones (11 Pa. St.)
449 (1849) ; Reed v. Reed, 2 Jones (12 Pa. St.) 117 (1849).
76. Stewart v. Stewart, 3 Watts 253 (Pa. 1834) ; McKee v. Phillips,
9 Watts 85 (Pa. 1839).
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necessary to achieve justice. 77 The latter rule invited no small
amount of controversy since wide differences of opinion existed
as to when justice is achieved in cases involving oral contracts.
The first case reaching the High Court of South Carolina pre-
sented a controversy initiated by a plaintiff who had failed to estab-
lish either a transfer of possession or payment of the consideration.
Although rendering an adverse decision to the plaintiff on the above
set of facts, the Supreme Court of South Carolina, declared in
Gwens v. Calder 7 that specific performance would be decreed if
the defendant either confessed the agreement, admitted the acts of
part performance or received payment of consideration. Although
the Court cited no authorities in the opinion, briefs of counsel indi-
cate that ample citations of the leading English cases were fur-
nished.7 0 While the question of whether or not part payment was
sufficient part performance was still being argued in the Mother
Country, it was a closed issue that the Statute was not waived by.
the defendant's admission of the oral contract.
Rejecting outright the doctrine of part performance, the Court
of Appeals in Kentucky in 180880 declared that as a result of the
exceptions read into the Act, the mischiefs remedied by the Statute
were left almost as much without redress as before. The Court also
noted, as an additional ground for refusing to follow the English
construction of the Act, that the Chancellors by "contrary and
irreconcilable decisions" had rendered it an uncertain and perplexed
rule of action.u-
In the neighboring state of Tennessee litigation is reported for
the year 181282 in which the plaintiff claimed payment of the con-
sideration was such part performance as to take the case out of the
Statute. Denying relief, the court observed that whether the case
was tested by the words of the Statute, or the better construction
by the English judges of their own Act, judgment should be against
the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals stated in
a later case 3 that open and exclusive possession on the part of the
purchaser, coupled with payment of the purchase price, would take
77. Smith v. Patton, 1 S. & R. 80 (Pa. 1814).
78. 2 Des. 171 (S.C. 1803).
79. Cases cited by counsel included Butcher v. Stapely, 1 Vern. 374(Ch. 1685); Pike v. Williams, 2 Vern. 454 (Ch. 1703); Whitchurch v.
Bevis, 2 Dick. 664 (Ch. 1786) ; Lacon v. Mertins, 3 Atk. 1 (Ch. 1743) ; Clerk
v. Wright, 1 Atk. 12 (Ch. 1737); and Whaley v. Bagnal, 6 Bro. P. C. 45(H.L. 1765).
80. Grant v. Craigmiles, 1 Bibb (4 Ky.) 203 (1808).
81. Hayden v. McIlwain, 4 Bibb. (7 Ky.) 57 (1815).
82. Townsend v. Sharp, 2 Overton 192 (Tenn. 1812).
83. Cox v. Cox, 1 Peck (Tenn.) 468 (1824).
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a case out of the Statute. Conceding that the English cases were
inconsistent, the Court declared that it was bound by the British
decisions, at least to the extent that they seemed to be founded on
good sense.
However, in the later Tennessee decision of Patton v. Mc-
Clure, 4 specific performance was denied, the Court disclaiming
any power to relieve against any of the provisions of the Statute.
Prior cases were distinguished on the ground that any references
that they made to the doctrine of part performance were dicta. Later
cases were decided in Tennessee 85 in accord with the Patton liti-
gation setting the issue at rest in that state.
In an opinion rendered by Chief Justice Chipman of the Ver-
mont Supreme Court in 1814, he proposed that the question be
asked, "does the part performance with the attending circum-
stances, make a case of fraud, against which a court of equity ought
to relieve ?''86 The learned Chief Justice implied that possession
would not be sufficient unless valuable improvements were made.
Since possession was not transferred, and specific performance was
denied, the enunciation with reference to improvements may be
treated as dicta. However, in disposing of another issue of the
cause, the court held the defendant could plead the Statute in bar
of the action, and that his failure to answer would not be taken as
an admission that a contract had been agreed upon by the parties.
However, refusal to answer a petition setting out acts of part per-
formance would result in a decree by default for the complainant.
The question with reference to whether a transfer of possession was
a sufficient act of part performance had not been decided by 1850.
In the Commonwealth of Virginia a divided Court of Appeals87
decreed specific performance in a suit brought by a purchaser who
had added improvements in reliance upon the agreement. While
one of the judges, following Lord Redesdale,88 declared that the
construction of the Statute by the equity courts had produced more
evil than good, another jurist stated that if the case were presented
for the first time in a similar situation, equity would give the
suffering party relief. The Court did not attempt to lay dovn
general principles to be applied in determining the acts that con-
stitute part performance.
84. 1 M. & Y. 468 (Tenn. 1828).
85. Ridley v. McNarry, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 174 (1840). Cases arising
after 1850 were decided in accord with the Ridley litigation.
86. Meach v. Stone, 1 D. Chip. 182, 190 (Vt. 1814).
87. Anthony v. Leftwich, 3 Rand. 238 (Va. 1825).
88. Lynch v. Lindsley, 2 Sch. & Lef. 4 (Ir. Ch. 1804).
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Davenport v. Mason 9 was resolved by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in 1818. The plaintiff upon taking posses-
sion, constructed improvements in reliance on the seller's promise
to convey. In response to the vendor's refusal to perform, the
purchaser brought an action in assumpsit and was awarded judg-
ment. The Court noted that the instant case represented an obvious
attempt to shelter fraud under a statute enacted for its suppression,
and observed that a stronger case of equity on the part of the
purchaser could not be imagined. Even though the issue -was not
raised in the case, the Court cited cases to sustain the proposition
that delivery of possession was a sufficient execution. However,
in later litigation the Davenport case was overruled.90 While it was
suggested in other cases that part performance might be recog-
nized in equity,91 the proposal had no meaning since Massachusetts
courts did not have general equity jurisdiction, and since they were
only empowered to compel specific execution of written contracts.
Obviously parol contracts could not be enforced under such a
statute. The Massachusetts cases were frequently cited by other
American Courts without a realization of their statutory setting.
Notwithstanding that it was apparently a case of first impres-
sion, the Supreme Court of Indiana decided Tibbs v. Barker92
without citing cases or giving reasons. Possession, payment of con-
sideration and the receipt of land office certificate were held to be
acts that would take the contract out of the Statute. In a more fully
considered case, 93 the same Court refused to decree specific per-
formance where a tenant already in possession, purchased the
premises and added valuable improvements. The Court failed to
distinguish between the line of cases, holding that the taking of
possession is part performance, and the series holding that the
mere continuance of possession is not of itself a sufficient act. In
the case under consideration no weight was given to the purchaser's
act of making expenditures in reliance on the agreement. In a later
adjudication 94 involving the twin acts of delivery of possession by
the vendor and the outlay for improvements by the purchaser,
89. 15 Mass. 85 (1818).
90. In Kidder v. Hunt, 1 Pick. (18 Mass.) 328, 11 Am. Dec. 183 (1823),
involving an action in Assumpsit, the court disclaimed the jurisdiction in a
court of law to recognize part performance, even though Massachusetts
had no court of Chancery. The statements in the Davenport case, recognizing
part performance, were considered dicta.
91. Thompson v. Gould, 20 Pick. (37 Mass.) 134 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1838),
Adams v. Townsend, 1 Metc. (42 Mass.) 483 (1840).
92. 1 Blackf. 58 (Ind. 1820).
93. Johnston v. Glancy, 4 Blackf. 94, 28 Am. Dec. 45 (Ind. 1835).
94. Underhill v. Williams, 7 Blackf. 125 (Ind. 1844).
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specific performance was decreed. The Court rationalized its deci-
sion on the ground that it was preventing a fraud on the purchaser
by enforcing the contract.
While the leading case in North Carolina, Ellis v. Ellis," was
resolved as early as 1828, the rule adopted in that State did not
appear in its final form until much later. The Supreme Court in
the first of two opinions delivered in subsequent stages of the Ellis
litigation, declared that acts in part performance referable to the
contract, would avoid the dangers anticipated by the Statute, and
specific performance would be decreed. In the second appeal96
specific execution was denied in the light of the defendant's aver-
ment that a different contract had been agreed upon by the parties.
The High Tribunal concluded in their second deliberation that the
plaintiff's act of taking possession did not obviate the objection
and the impropriety of going into an inquiry to ascertain the terms
of the oral bargain.
Later cases97 construed the reasoning advanced in the Ellis
litigation to mean that parol contracts would not be specifically
enforced, although it was recognized that a separate equity might
arise because of the plaintiff's reliance on the agreement. It was
proposed by the court that compensation be awarded in the latter
case.
The Alabama Supreme Court,98 in disposing of an appeal in
1836, expressed a regret that there had ever been a departure from
the letter of the Statute. However, the Court declared that the
Alabama statute was adopted with the decisions of the English and
American Courts on this point in the contemplation of the legis-
lature. Bound by authority, the Court specifically enforced an oral
contract on behalf of a purchaser who had made improvements
after the transfer of possession.99
In a well reasoned opinion written in 1839,100 the Supreme
Court of Arkansas joined the ranks of the courts deploring the
fact that equity had taken any cases out of the requirements of the
Statute. Despite its preference in the matter, the Court did not
consider itself at liberty to disregard the whole current of English
and American decisions that have been made upon the Statute.
95. 1 Dev. Eq. 181 (N.C. 1828).
96. Ellis v. Ellis, 1 Dev. Eq. 342 (N.C. 1828).
97. Baker v. Carson, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 381 (N.C. 1836); Albea v.
Griffin, 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 9 (N.C. 1838); Dunn v. Moore, 3 Ired. Eq.(N.C.) 364 (1844) ; Allen v. Chambers, 4 Ired. Eq. 125 (N.C. 1845).
98. Allen v. Booker, 2 Stew. 21, 19 Am. Dec. 23 (Ala. 1829).
99. Brock v. Cook, 3 Port. 464 (Ala. 1836).
100. Keatts v. Rector, 1 Pike. 391 (Ark. 1839).
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Addressing themselves to the question of what constituted part
performance, they found two classes of cases. One group arose
when possession was delivered under the contract and in reference
to it; while in the other line of cases specific performance was de-
creed where the purchaser had changed his position because of the
bargain, and hardship would result if the agreement was not per-
formed. Possession having been delivered to the plaintiff in ac-
cordance to and referable to an oral agreement, specific execution
was decreed in the case at bar.
In 184011 the Court of Last Resort of Illinois, declining to enter
into a discussion of the contradictory decisions of the English and
American courts, declared that there was no question but that
where in the same case there was delivery of possession, payment
of the purchase price and the making of improvements, equity
would enforce the contract. The purchaser, having satisfied the
above requisites, was granted specific enforcement.
Decided in 1848 by the Supreme Court of Iowa, McCoy v.
Hughes10 2 arose from the defendant's failure to convey a land
claim which he had agreed to sell. The plaintiff had entered into
possession and had made valuable improvements pursuant to the
oral agreement. "Principles of soundest morality sanctioned by the
rules of justice and equity," declared the Court, "require relief
against such fraud."' 0 3
Overruling prior Chancery cases, 10 4 which have recognized part
performance, the Supreme Court of Mississippi declared in 1848105
that the Mississippi Statute of Frauds contained no exceptions
and hence oral land contracts would not be enforced either in law
or equity. In the year following the High Court reiterated its pre-
vious stand, announcing that if the Statute was too rigid in its
terms, the remedy was within the power of the legislature.10
Although cases of first impression had also been decided in
the courts of Delaware,107 Maine,308 Maryland, 0 9 Ohio, 011  Mis-
101. Thornton v. Vaughan, 2 Seam. (3 Il.) 219 (1840).
102. 1 Greene 370 (Iowa 1848).
103. Id. at 374.
104. Finucane v. Kearney, 1 Freem. Ch. 65 (Miss. 1843) ; See Hood
v. Bowman, 1 Freem. Ch. 290 (Miss. 1843).
105. Beaman v. Buck, 9 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 207 (1848).
106. Box v. Stanford, 13 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 93, 51 Am. Dec. 142
(1849).
107. Houston v. Townsend, 1 Del. Ch. 416, 12 Am. Dec. 109 (1833),
aff'd, 1 Harr. 532, 27 Am. Dec. 732 (Del. 1835) (payment of money may be
recognized to be performance of a parol contract concerning lands).
108. Maine followed Mass. . . .Wilton v. Harwood, 33 Maine 13
(1843). Only -a limited equity jurisdiction was concerred on the court.
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souri,"' New Hampshire,'1 2 New Jersey,1 13 Michigan'14 and Wis-
consin"-5 by 1850, they added no new principles to those developed
in the foregoing discussion.
THE UNCERTAINTY IN THE AMERICAN CASE LAW OF PART PER-
FORMANCE MAY BE TRACED TO ITS HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Whether or not the draftsmen intended that the provisions of
Section Four should apply to bills in equity is now a matter of no
consequence. What was the attitude of the eighteenth century judi-
ciary, is the question to be determined; for if the judges of that
period understood the Statute to exclude suits in equity from its
operation, the cases must be analyzed in terms of the construction
of that date, rather than the interpretation that would be made
today.
Considered in this setting, the post-statute cases are significant,
not only because they established that the acts of delivering pos-
session to the vendee or the act of making improvements are suffi-
cient to invoke equitable aid on behalf of the purchaser, but also
because in arriving at these decisions, the courts were at the same
time adjudicating that the Statute did not prohibit chancery from
enforcing oral contracts in that forum.
109. Drury v. Connor, 6 Harris & J. 288 (Md. 1823) (delivery of
possession and payment wil itake a case out of the Statute); Hamilton v.
Jones, 3 Gill & J. 127 (Md. 1831) (to withhold relief would be to suffer a
party seeking to shelter himself under the Statute of Frauds, to commit
fraud) ; Beard v. Linthicum, 1 Md. Ch. 345 (1848) (complainant must show
acts unequivocally referring to and resulting from that agreement, such as
the party would not have done unless on that agreement).
110. Sites v. Kellar, 6 Ham. 484 (Ohio 1834) (payment of purchase
price does not take the case out of the Statute).
111. Bean v. Valle, 2 Mo. 126 (1829) (distinction between delivery of
possession and taking of possession, the former only recognized as a sufficient
act) ; Chambers v. Lecompte, 9 Mo. 336 (1845) (payment of money not a
sufficient act).
112. Newton v. Swazey, 8 N. H. 9 (1835) (specific performance de-
creed where plaintiff enters into possession and makes improvements; Dicta
that confession of agreement in defendant's answer takes the case out of the
Statute) ; see Tilton v. Tilton, 9 N. H. 385 (1838).
113. Casler v. Thompson, 3 Green (4 N.J. Eq.) 59 (1837) (delivery of
possession, payment of purchase price and adding of improvements takes a
case out of the Statute).
114. Burtch v. Hogge, 1 Har. 31 (Mich. 1842) (payment of purchase
money and adding of improvements sufficient acts of performance) ; accord,
McMurtrie v. Bennette, 1 Har. 124(Mich. 1842). In Weed v. Terry, Walk.
Ch. 501 (Mich. 1844), delivery of possession held sufficient act to take case
out of the Statute.
115. Bowen v. Warner, 1 Pin. 600 (Wis. 1845) (Act of continuing
possession held not sufficient to prove part performance. Ground of the
interference by the court is that there is fraud on the part of the seller in
resisting the agreement).
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Once it had been adjudged that equity would decree specific
performance if possession were delivered or improvements were
added in reliance on the agreement the rationalization of the court
is unimportant. The application of the doctrine of stare decisis
rendered certain that specific performance would be decreed upon
a showing by the complainant of a like set of facts. Principles were
promulgated by the courts not for the purpose of establishing juris-
diction but for guidance in deciding when the chancery jurisdic-
tion should be exercised. Rules were formulated to determine when
a case came within the policy of the Statute, and not to create
reasons to take it out of the Statute.
The American courts were troubled by the conflict in the Eng-
lish decisions with reference to the doctrine of part performance.
But what the courts failed to realize, and what clearly appears when
the case law is studied historically, is that the conflict involved only
a few issues. They assumed disproportionate dimensions because
of the long period of time in which they remained unsettled. Refer-
ence has been made in previous paragraphs to the difficulty the
courts had with the question of whether payment of the purchase
price was an act of part performance,116 and the problem of the
confessed oral agreement' 7 in relation to the defendant's right to
plead the Statute. These relatively minor questions created an
appearance of uncertainty that lingered long after the issue had been
finally determined. The power of the court to grant relief if pos-
session had been delivered to the purchaser, or if the purchaser had
made permanent improvements in reliance upon the agreement,
were unquestioned after 1700. Even the effect of part payment and
the confession of the oral contract had been determined by 1765,
and had the American courts been more discerning in their selec-
tion of precedents, the welter of confusion would have never oc-
curred.
What produced the conflict in American case law? In response
it may be stated that the confusion in the law may be traced to the
reception of the doctrine of part performance in this country. De-
spite the fact that the original Act was adopted in the eastern states
in substantially its same form, and in spite of the existence of an
ample number of cases construing the Parent Act, the states
adopted a multiplicity of interpretations. Some of the courts" 8
either from the beginning or after a brief struggle with the British
116. Supra at note 46.
117. Supra at note 38.
118. Kentucky supra at note 80; Tennessee supra at note 84; North
Carolina supra at note 96; and Mississippi supra at note 105.
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cases, announced that not being bound by the English construction,
they did not propose to read exceptions into the Act. This effective-
ly erased the confusion not to mention the fact that it obstructed
the rendition of justice.
A contrary position was taken in some jurisdictions, where after
carefully examining the British rule and after identifying the dual
characteristics of the doctrine, the court marked out a pattern that
produced no subsequent difficulty."19
The remainder of the jurisdictions made mistakes which fell
into three categories. The error committed by those of the first
group consisted of mixing factual situations which had been ad-
judicated to be part performance, such as delivery of possession,
with the rationalization emerging from controversies resolved on
acts of another nature. The consequence was the formulation of a
rule in some instances that specific performance would not be de-
creed unless the delivery of possession was coupled with the mak-
ing of valuable improvements. Thus a new principle has been pro-
nounced because of a misunderstanding of the English cases.12 0
A similar result was reached through accident where the first
case decided by a court involved a number of facts, any one of
which would have justified specific performance of the contract.
By promulgating principles unduly restrictive in scope, the courts
adjudicating that particular case, made difficult the adjudgment of
future cases. If the court asserts that equitable fraud is the basis
for enforcing oral land contracts in the first case, the second con-
troversy may only involve a transfer of possession. The court is
faced with a dilemma; for on the one hand the English cases recog-
nize that the act of delivering possession is sufficient part perform-
ance, while on the other hand, the court has previously announced
that part performance was based on equitable fraud. The tribunal
can modify the former holding, or start a new line of cases, or it can
rationalize that permitting the purchaser to enter into possession
was a specie of fraud. If either of the latter two alternatives is
followed, confusion in the law is produced. 121
Failure to distinguish between the issues relating to the doc-
trine of part performance that had not been decided, and those that
had been finally determined, was the second type of mistake. When
a court discovered they were following cases long overruled in the
119. Arkansas supra at note 101; Ohio supra at note 110.
120. New York sipra at note 73.
121. Other examples are Connecticut supra at note 70, Pennsylvania
supra at notes 75 and 76, and Maryland supra at note 109.
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parent country, it was necessary to backtrack if their decisions
were to be brought in line with the prevailing rule. This, they
often did by distinguishing cases or by ignoring previous errors in
preference to overruling the cases by direct language. Illustrative
of this mistake are the cases that stated part payment is a sufficient
act of part performance.1
22
The third error was in the acceptance of Lord Redesdale's
declaration that the Statute had resulted in as great a fraud as the
Statute was designed to protect. The attempt to simultaneously
apply Lord Jeffrey's construction of the Statute as expressed in the
precedents, and Lord Redesdale's opinions, resulted in the creation
of reasoning incompatible with either.12 3
In conclusion it may be said that in individual cases, the oral
agreement claimed by the complainant was often a fraudulent one,
which led the chancellor deciding the controversy to condemn all
agreements. Thus blinded by the chancellor's repudiation of indi-
vidual cases, the American courts often overlooked the fact that
part performance had survived criticisms directed against it for
more than four centuries only because it was based on a sound
equitable principle. It is this fact that must be kept in mind in
analyzing any and all cases of part performance.
In a subsequent article the cases decided after 1850 will be
discussed and an analysis made of the state of the law of part per-
formance as it exists today.324
122. This is illustrated by New Hampshire supra at note 112. Ob-
serve the dicta relating to the effect of defendant's confession of the oral
agreement in his answer.
123. Illustrative of this point are Indiana supra at note 92, and Ala-
bama supra at note 98.
124. No attempt has been made to classify the cases on the basis of the
various theories advanced in explanation of part performance. However, the
classification will be analyzed in part two of this article.
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